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Considerable research has focused on understanding variation in reproductive skew in cooperative animal
societies, but the pace of theoretical development has far outstripped empirical testing of the models. One
major class of model suggests that dominant individuals can use the threat of eviction to deter subordinate
reproduction (the ‘restraint’ model), but this idea remains untested. Here, we use long-term behavioural
and genetic data to test the assumptions of the restraint model in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), a
species in which subordinates breed regularly and evictions are common. We found that dominant
females suffer reproductive costs when subordinates breed, and respond to these costs by evicting breed-
ing subordinates from the group en masse, in agreement with the assumptions of the model. We found no
evidence, however, that subordinate females exercise reproductive restraint to avoid being evicted in the
ﬁrst place. This means that the pattern of reproduction is not the result of a reproductive ‘transaction’ to
avert the threat of eviction. We present a simple game theoretical analysis that suggests that eviction
threats may often be ineffective to induce pre-emptive restraint among multiple subordinates and predicts
that threats of eviction (or departure) will be much more effective in dyadic relationships and linear hier-
archies. Transactional models may be more applicable to these systems. Greater focus on testing the
assumptions rather than predictions of skew models can lead to a better understanding of how animals
control each other’s reproduction, and the extent to which behaviour is shaped by overt acts versus
hidden threats.
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1. INTRODUCTION
An important goal of research on social evolution is to
determine how conﬂict over reproduction is resolved in
cooperatively breeding groups, and what strategies ani-
mals can employ to control each others’ behaviour
(Frank 2003; Ratnieks et al. 2006; Reeve & Shen 2006;
Buston & Zink 2009; Cant & Johnstone 2009; Clutton-
Brock 2009). In some species, dominant individuals
suppress subordinate reproduction by interfering with
mating, monopolizing access to breeding resources, indu-
cing physiological stress or killing subordinate offspring
(Digby 2000; Vehrencamp 2000; Magrath et al. 2004;
Saltzman et al. 2008; Young et al. 2008; Hodge 2009;
Young 2009). Where these direct forms of control are
inefﬁcient or unfeasible, current theory suggests that
dominants will use the threat of eviction to place an
upper limit on the level of subordinate reproduction
(the ‘restraint’ model; Johnstone & Cant 1999; Johnstone
2000; Cant 2006; Buston et al. 2007). The power of evic-
tion threats to inﬂuence behaviour has been convincingly
demonstrated by recent studies of ﬁsh size hierarchies in
which subordinates restrain their growth to avoid eviction
by their immediate dominant (Ang & Manica in press;
Buston 2003; Buston & Cant 2006; Wong et al. 2007,
2008). In cooperative vertebrates and primitively eusocial
insects, dominant individuals often evict subordinates
from groups (Johnstone & Cant 1999), but it remains
unknown whether the threat of eviction can be used to
induce reproductive restraint in the manner assumed by
the models.
Banded mongooses (Mungos mungo) are an ideal
species to address this shortfall in knowledge because
subordinates breed regularly and evictions are common.
The species lives in stable, mixed-sex groups of around
eight to 40 individuals that defend territories year-round
and breed two to four times per year (Cant 2000;
Gilchrist et al. 2004). Each group contains a core
cohort of between one and ﬁve dominant females
(mean+s.d. ¼ 2.90+0.91) that are older than the
other females in the group and aggressively evict younger
females (Cant et al. 2001). All females older than nine
months enter oestrus around the same time (i.e. within
10 days of each other), and mate with one or more
males from within the group. Most females in the group
give birth in each breeding attempt, usually on the same
day (Cant 2000; Gilchrist 2006), and group members
cooperate to guard and provision offspring until they
are three months old (Gilchrist 2004; Hodge 2005,
2007; Bell 2007; Gilchrist & Russell 2007). This extreme
birth synchrony probably reduces the ability of dominants
to use infanticide as a means of reproductive control
because females may risk inadvertently killing their own
young if they attempt to kill the offspring of other females
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control may also be limited, since dominant females do
not interfere with the mating behaviour of subordinates
and do not monopolize food resources or access to natal
dens (Cant 2000; De Luca & Ginsberg 2001). In this
system, therefore, eviction may be the most effective way
for dominants to limit reproductive competition from
subordinates.
The restraint model is based on three key assumptions:
(i) that dominant individuals experience reproductive
competition when subordinates reproduce, (ii) that domi-
nants respond to reproductive competition by evicting
subordinate breeders, and (iii) that subordinates respond
to the threat of eviction by exercising reproductive
restraint. Below we test these three assumptions using
long-term data from the banded mongoose system and
use a simple game-theoretical model to explore the effec-
tiveness of threats in multimember groups.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Study population and data collection
We studied a population totalling over 1400 individuals living
in 20 study groups in and around Mweya Peninsula, Queen
Elizabeth National Park, Uganda (08120 S, 278540 E),
between November 1995 and April 2008. Details of habitat
and climate are given elsewhere (Cant 2000). The animals
were trapped regularly using live traps, anaesthetized and
ﬁtted with colour-coded plastic collars for identiﬁcation
(see Cant 2000 for details). Two individuals in each group
were ﬁtted with radiocollars. Most groups were habituated
to walking observers (from less than 5 m). Behavioural obser-
vations were taken by two observers using hand-held Psion
organizers and downloaded to the central database each eve-
ning. Most individuals were trained to step onto an electronic
weighing balance in return for a small (less than 1 ml) reward
of dilute milk, allowing daily weights to be collected without
the need for capture. Pregnancy lasts for 60–70 days in
banded mongooses and can be identiﬁed at around 40 days
by swelling of the abdomen and an increase in body mass
(Cant 2000; Gilchrist 2006). Birth dates can be accurately
determined by a sudden change in the female’s weight and
body shape. For the analysis of dominant females’ pup
survival, dominance status was assigned on the basis of dis-
continuous age structure of groups and/or aggressive
behaviour during eviction. In practice, dominants were
readily identiﬁed by eviction behaviour and because females
typically fell into two clear age cohorts, separated by a mini-
mum of one year. Evictions were deﬁned as cases when adult
females left their group for at least one day as a consequence
of aggression from older females. In 28 eviction events,
aggression was either observed directly, or females were
seen away from their group with conspicuous wounds. In
three events, groups were not observed on the day that sev-
eral females left the group, in which case eviction was
assumed to have occurred on the grounds that no instances
of voluntary female dispersal have been observed in our
study population.
(b) Genotyping of maternity
Maternity cannot be determined observationally, so we used
microsatellite DNA analysis to determine maternity and
explore the impact of breeder number on the survival of
pups born to dominant mothers. DNA was extracted from
tissue samples using lysis with proteinase K followed by a
phenol: chloroform puriﬁcation and genotyped at 14 poly-
morphic microsatellite loci (see electronic supplementary
material for details). Maternity was assigned at 95% conﬁ-
dence and included all females who were known to be
pregnant prior to the birth of the litter as candidate mothers.
(c) Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses were performed in GENSTAT 11.1 (VSN
International Ltd., Hemel Hempstead, UK). Where multi-
factorial analyses were required, generalized linear mixed
models (GLMMs) with a binomial error structure and a
logit link function were used to take into account repeated
sampling within individuals, breeding attempts or groups.
Analyses controlled for group identity, litter identity,
group size and total rainfall post-birth as appropriate.
Random terms were retained in the model unless variance
components were found to be zero. All statistical tests are
two-tailed.
(i) Analysis of reproductive competition
We investigated the inﬂuence of the number of breeding
females on litter survival in the den by scoring whether or
not at least one pup survived to emerge from the natal den
as the binomial response term in a GLMM for 306 litters
born in 19 groups. For the analysis of pup survival post-
emergence, we scored the number of pups that survived to
independence (three months) in 214 litters born in 17
groups as the binomial response term in a GLMM, with
the number of emergent pups as the denominator. Both of
these survival analyses included group size (individuals
greater than six months) and rainfall (mm) (both predictors
of food available to pups) as covariates. Group identity was
ﬁtted in both models as a random term to control for terri-
tory quality. To assess whether any effect of female number
on survival was due to variation in litter size, we also
looked at the inﬂuence of litter size on pup survival to inde-
pendence. The survival of 1357 pups in 220 breeding
attempts in 17 groups was ﬁtted in a binomial GLMM,
with litter size at emergence included as the main term of
interest. Rainfall (mm) and group size were ﬁtted as covari-
ates and litter and group identity were ﬁtted as random
terms.
To investigate whether the number of breeding females
inﬂuenced the survival of dominant female’s pups between
emergence and independence, the number of pups assigned
to each dominant female was ﬁtted as the binomial response
term in a GLMM, with the number of emergent pups
assigned to each mother as the denominator. This analysis
was conducted on 165 emergent pups born to 45 dominant
females over 65 breeding attempts in nine groups. Group,
mother and litter identity were included as random terms.
The inﬂuence of female number on the total number of
pups that survived to independence (three months) per
breeding female was determined using a non-parametric
Kruskal–Wallis test followed by Mann–Whitney U tests
(n ¼ 306 litters in 19 groups). Non-parametric tests were
necessary in this case as data showed severe
heteroscedasticity.
(ii) Analysis of eviction
To investigate the probability of an eviction event occurring,
we ﬁtted whether an eviction event occurred in 226 breeding
attempts in 15 groups as the binomial response term in a
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ﬁtted as the main term of interest, group size and total rain-
fall in the previous 60 days were ﬁtted a covariates and group
identity was included as a random term. To investigate which
females were targeted for eviction, we took all subordinate
females of breeding age (greater than 10 months) in the
group when an eviction occurred and ﬁtted whether or not
they were evicted as the binomial response term in a
GLMM. Each female’s pregnancy status at eviction (preg-
nant and non-pregnant) was included as the main term of
interest. Female age (days), mean non-pregnant weight in
the two months before eviction (g), group size, the number
of females of breeding age and rainfall (mm) were included
as covariates. Group, litter and female identity were included
as random terms. This analysis used a dataset of 93 potential
evictions involving 66 subordinate females in 19 breeding
attempts in four groups.
(iii) Analysis of reproductive restraint
To investigate whether females were less likely to breed as
the number of females of reproductive age (older than
10 months) increased, we conducted a GLMM which
ﬁtted whether or not each female in the group gave birth in
a breeding attempt as the binomial response term. The
number of females of reproductive age was included as the
main term of interest and group size, rainfall in the 60 days
prior to birth (mm), female age (months) and mean female
weight in the two weeks around conception (g) were included
as covariates. Group identity was included as a random
term. The analysis was conducted on 258 potential birth
opportunities involving 55 females in 52 litters in six
groups. To assess the factors that inﬂuenced which females
return from eviction, we took all females who were pregnant
when evicted and ﬁtted whether on not they returned in a
binomial GLMM. This analysis used a dataset of 52 females
over 15 eviction events in six groups. Pregnancy status in the
week after eviction, female age (less than 2 and greater than
2 years), group size, the number of females of breeding age
in the week post-eviction and rainfall in the 60 days prior
to eviction (mm) were included as covariates. Group and
eviction event were included as random terms.
3. RESULTS
(a) Do dominant females experience reproductive
competition when subordinates breed?
Across all breeding attempts (n ¼ 306), the average
number of breeding females (+s.d.) per breeding attempt
was 3.4+2.0, representing a mean proportion of 0.71
(range 0.1–1.0) of adult females in each group. We
tested the effect of the number of breeding females on off-
spring survival in two distinct phases of offspring care
(Hodge 2007): ﬁrst, the period for which pups remain
underground in the den (up to 30 days), and second,
the period between emergence and nutritional indepen-
dence (90 days). Litter survival in the den (measured as
the proportion of litters from which at least one pup sur-
vived) increased signiﬁcantly with the number of females
that bred (GLMM: x2
1 ¼ 30:03, p , 0.001; ﬁgure 1a).
There was no evidence, therefore, that additional bree-
ders had a negative impact on offspring survival in the
period for which offspring are kept underground.
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Figure 1. The inﬂuence of the number of breeding females on (a) litter survival to emergence (n ¼ 306 litters from 19 groups);
(b) the proportion of emergent pups per litter that survived to independence at age three months (n ¼ 214 breeding attempts
from 17 groups); (c) the proportion of emergent pups assigned to each dominant female (using microsatellite DNA analysis)
that survived to three months (n ¼ 65 breeding attempts from nine groups); and (d) per capita female success per breeding
attempt (number of pups per female that survived to independence at three months; n ¼ 306 breeding attempts from 19
groups). (a)–(c) show predicted means (+s.e.) and ﬁtted model from a GLMM controlling for repeated measures among
groups and (d) shows a quadratic regression ﬁtted to the means.
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val initially increased and then declined when the
number of breeders grew large (GLMM: number of
breeding females: x2
1 ¼ 4:16, p ¼ 0.043; (number of
breeding females)
2: x2
1 ¼ 3:99, p ¼ 0.047; ﬁgure 1b).
This decline appears to reﬂect increased offspring compe-
tition for food in larger litters. Litter size at emergence
was positively correlated with the number of breeders
(linear regression: F1,214¼50.19, p , 0.001, R
2 ¼ 18.8),
and litter size had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on pup survival.
Pup survival initially increased with emergent litter size,
but then declined in very large litters (GLMM: emergent
litter size: x2
1 ¼ 8:64, p ¼ 0.004; (emergent litter size)
2:
x2
1 ¼ 4:68, p ¼ 0.032). There was evidence, therefore,
that pup survival after emergence declined when many
females reproduced.
The above results are based on average pup survival
for all breeding females because we cannot assign
mothers on the basis of behavioural observations in
this species (Cant 2000; Gilchrist 2006; Bell 2007;
Hodge et al. 2009). However, for a subset of litters,
we were able to assign maternity using microsatellite
DNA analysis to test directly whether dominant females
experience reproductive costs when large numbers of
other females breed. The proportion of pups assigned
to dominant females that survived between emergence
and independence declined signiﬁcantly as the
number of breeding females increased (GLMM: 4.52,
p¼0.036; ﬁgure 1c). In the post-emergence period,
therefore, both mean offspring survival and the survival
of dominant females’ offspring speciﬁcally were lower
when large numbers of females reproduced. Overall,
the average per capita reproductive success of breeding
females measured across both periods of offspring care
was highest when an intermediate number of females
reproduced (Kruskal–Wallis test: H ¼ 34.63, p ,
0.001; Mann–Whitney U tests, one versus two to
seven females: n ¼ 56, 179, W ¼ 2066.5, p,0.001; two
to seven versus greater than seven females: n ¼9, 179,
W ¼ 354, p ¼ 0.003).
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Figure 2. Patterns of eviction and reproduction: (a) probability that one or more females were evicted versus number of adult
females in the group. On average six females were evicted in each event. Graph shows predicted means (+s.e.) from a GLMM
controlling for repeated measures among groups (n ¼ 226 breeding attempts). (b) Female pregnancy status versus probability
of being evicted. Graph shows predicted means (+s.e.) from a GLMM controlling for repeated measures among litters, groups
and individuals (n ¼ 66 females). (c) Number of breeding females per group in the breeding attempt preceding an eviction
event (‘pre’), the breeding attempt in which an eviction event occurred mid-way through gestation (‘eviction’) and the sub-
sequent breeding attempt (‘post’). Open bars are eviction events in which all evicted females eventually rejoined the group
(n ¼ 18) (temporary evictions) and shaded bars are eviction events that led to permanent dispersal (n ¼ 9) (permanent
eviction). Asterisks indicate post hoc signiﬁcance level compared with ‘pre’ bar of the respective categories (*p , 0.05;
***p , 0.001). (d) Probability of return to the group within one week of eviction of 52 pregnant females as a function of
their pregnancy status one week after eviction. Graph shows predicted means (+s.e.) from a GLMM controlling for repeated
measures among litters and groups (n ¼ 52 females).
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competition by evicting subordinate breeders?
We observed a total of 31 female eviction events in seven
groups, resulting in the eviction of 186 females of breed-
ing age. The average number of females in the group prior
to eviction was 8.86 (+0.39) and on average six females
were evicted in each event (range 1–13). All eviction
events occurred during periods when reproductive con-
ﬂict between females was likely to be high: 70 per cent
occurred when the group were in the latter stages of preg-
nancy (greater than 35 days post-oestrus) and 30 per cent
occurred when the group were in oestrus. The probability
that an eviction event occurred increased sharply with the
number of potential breeding females in the group at that
time (GLMM: x2
1 ¼ 24:20, p , 0.001; ﬁgure 2a). Domi-
nants speciﬁcally targeted reproductive subordinates for
eviction: females that were pregnant were more likely to
be evicted compared with those that were not (GLMM:
x2
1 ¼ 11:74, p ¼ 0.006; ﬁgure 2b).
In nine eviction events, all evicted females perma-
nently left the group, reducing the number of adult
females in the group from 9.33 (+0.85) to 3.89
(+0.46) (paired t-test: t8 ¼ 6.52, p , 0.001). In 18 evic-
tion events, all evicted females eventually rejoined the
group (‘temporary evictions’) and in four eviction
events, some females returned and the remainder dis-
persed. In temporary eviction events, the number of
pregnant females was signiﬁcantly lower in the breeding
attempt immediately following eviction than in the
breeding attempt before eviction (paired t-test: t16 ¼
2.86, p ¼ 0.017; ﬁgure 2c). For permanent evictions,
the number of breeders was reduced in both of the two
subsequent breeding attempts (ANOVA: F2,20 ¼ 11.78,
p , 0.001; ﬁgure 2c).
(c) Do subordinate females respond to the threat of
eviction by exercising reproductive restraint?
After controlling for a positive inﬂuence of female weight
(GLMM: x2
1 ¼ 4:62, p ¼ 0.034), females were not less
likely to breed in a given breeding attempt as the
number of females of reproductive age in the group
increased (GLMM: x2
1 ¼ 0:12, p ¼ 0.73). There was no
evidence, therefore, that subordinate females exercised
reproductive restraint when the probability of an eviction
event was high. However, pregnant subordinates that
were evicted often aborted their litter within a few days
and were reaccepted into the group. Of 32 females that
were pregnant when evicted and later rejoined the
group, 25 (78%) aborted before they were readmitted.
Females that aborted their litter in the week after eviction
were more likely to return than those that did not
(GLMM: x2
1 ¼ 5:55, p ¼ 0.025; ﬁgure 2d). Of those
females that were evicted and readmitted, we found no
difference in the probability of being visibly pregnant in
the breeding attempt following eviction compared with
the breeding attempt prior to eviction (proportion of
evicted females breeding pre-eviction ¼ 2.80+0.60, pro-
portion of evicted females breeding post-eviction ¼
3.19+0.53; paired t-test: t15 ¼ 20.59, p ¼ 0.57).
Hence, females did not respond to temporary eviction
by foregoing reproduction in the subsequent breeding
attempt.
4. DISCUSSION
We found strong support for the ﬁrst two assumptions of
the restraint model, namely that subordinate reproduc-
tion is costly to dominants and that dominant
individuals respond to increased reproductive compe-
tition by evicting subordinate breeders. By contrast, we
found no evidence that subordinates exercise reproduc-
tive restraint to avoid being evicted in the ﬁrst place.
There are at least two likely reasons for the failure of evic-
tion threats to induce pre-emptive restraint in this system.
First, pregnant subordinates who were evicted could
usually regain access to the group if they aborted their
litter. Spontaneous abortion may be a side-effect of the
physiological stress of eviction, or the proximate mechan-
ism by which subordinates maximize their probability of
readmittance (Young et al. 2006). In either case, the
capacity of subordinates to respond retrospectively and
return to the group is likely to erode any incentive to exer-
cise reproductive restraint pre-emptively. Second, even
non-pregnant subordinates were frequently evicted
(ﬁgure 2b). This may be because dominants cannot
discriminate pregnant and non-pregnant subordinates,
or because it does not pay them to discriminate since
females that are currently non-pregnant are nevertheless
very likely to breed in the next breeding attempt. As
a consequence, however, subordinate females have little
to gain from cooperating by exercising pre-emptive
restraint.
This second point highlights a general issue with the
use of threats to induce cooperation in multimember
groups. Restraint is expected in the original two-player
restraint model (Johnstone & Cant 1999) because in
this case the threat of eviction is perfectly targeted: a sub-
ordinate is certain to be evicted if it claims more than the
maximum tolerated by the dominant, and certain to avoid
eviction if it exercises restraint. Where non-transgressors
are sometimes evicted, however, the evolution of pre-
emptive restraint faces a coordination problem similar
to the prisoner’s dilemma. This coordination problem is
illustrated in ﬁgure 3, which shows the result of a
simple model of reproductive restraint when groups con-
tain two subordinates instead of one, and where
dominants vary in the degree to which they single out
transgressors for eviction (see appendix). In the unshaded
region marked ‘restraint’, restraint by both subordinates is
evolutionarily stable and no eviction occurs. In the shaded
region marked ‘defection’, both subordinates do best to
defect, regardless of the strategy of the other. In between
there is a region marked ‘social dilemma’ where the Nash
equilibrium outcome is defection (and consequent evic-
tion), even though both subordinates would do better if
they could agree to exercise restraint. The model predicts,
therefore, that reproductive restraint rapidly becomes evo-
lutionarily unstable where punishments are targeted with
less than perfect accuracy (a similar conclusion is reached
by Boyd & Richerson (1992) who refer to targeted pun-
ishment as ‘retribution’ to distinguish it from
punishment that falls upon a group).
The model suggests that eviction threats will be more
effective in dyadic relationships and dominance hierar-
chies in which transgressors are clearly distinguished
from non-transgressors. This result helps to explain why
the threat of eviction exerts such a strong inﬂuence on
growth strategies in ﬁsh size hierarchies. In these
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immediate subordinate. Threats of punishment are most
effective in these circumstances for two reasons. First,
transgressors can be identiﬁed with certainty, avoiding
the social dilemma illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Second, the
rewards of cooperation ﬂow directly back to the punisher,
avoiding the ‘second-order free rider’ problem (Boyd &
Richerson 1992; Boyd et al. 2003) which hampers the
spread of punishment strategies in non-hierarchical
models of cooperation (Boyd & Richerson 1992; Boyd
et al. 2003; Bowles & Gintis 2004; Panchanathan &
Boyd 2004). Dominance hierarchies are common in
social vertebrates and were a likely feature of ancestral
hominids prior to more recent transitions to egalitarian-
ism (as inferred from the social structure of hunter–
gatherers; Boehm 1999; Svensson 2009). Economic
models that feature symmetrical players and equal sharing
of public goods may therefore underestimate the extent to
which cooperation in these systems has been shaped by
punishment and threats.
Our study shows that banded mongooses are not in the
steady equilibrium state assumed by transactional models
of skew. The use of eviction as a means of reproductive
control, coupled with the ineffectiveness of eviction
threats to induce restraint, leads to the periodic forced
dispersal of adult breeders from their natal group and
ﬂuctuations in group size. By contrast, eviction is rarely
observed in ﬁsh size hierarchies, precisely because the
threat of eviction is effective at inducing growth restraint
in these systems (Buston 2003). Observations of frequent
eviction, therefore, offer good prima facie evidence of the
ineffectiveness of eviction threats to induce cooperation.
Moreover, since the factors that increase the effectiveness
of exit threats also increase group stability, species in
which group members form a linear hierarchy are pre-
dicted to exhibit greater genetic differentiation between
groups than non-hierarchical species, other things being
equal. Understanding this link between within-group
conﬂict and social stability is important for a more general
theory of social evolution because patterns of dispersal are
expected to exert a strong inﬂuence on selection for help-
ing and harming behaviour (West et al. 2002; Gardner &
West 2006; Johnstone & Cant 2008; Gardner 2010).
In addition to the accurate targeting of punishments,
effective threats require that receivers possess (or can
acquire) accurate information about the location of
threat thresholds and the consequences of triggering a
threat. Transactional models are thus reliant on a
number of critical assumptions that remain implicit in
the original models, and few studies to date have eluci-
dated these assumptions or tested whether they hold in
the social system of interest. We believe that further pro-
gress in the study of reproductive skew can be gained not
by focusing on correlations between skew and various
model parameters, but by testing the assumptions under-
lying the models and identifying what behavioural
strategies animals can use to control each other’s social
behaviour. For example, studies to test whether threats
are effective can help to rule out reproductive transactions
(whether based on the idea of concessions, Vehrencamp
1983; Reeve & Ratnieks 1993; or restraint, Johnstone &
Cant 1999) as an explanation for the pattern of subordi-
nate reproduction. Conversely, evidence that animals
respond to exit threats (e.g. Buston 2003; Wong et al.
2007, 2008; Ang & Manica in press) suggests that trans-
actional models may apply well in some systems.
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Figure 3. A model of reproductive restraint with two subor-
dinates. Groups consist of a single dominant and two
subordinates of equal rank. Zones for which the evolutiona-
rily stable outcome is mutual reproductive restraint
(unshaded) or defection and consequent eviction of one of
the subordinates (shaded) are plotted as a function of the
cost of being evicted and the degree to which dominants
single out transgressors for punishment (targeting, z). The
zones marked ‘restraint’ and ‘defection’ indicate areas
where the strategies of restraint and defection are, respect-
ively, strictly dominant, i.e. they yield the highest pay-off
irrespective of the strategy of the other player. In the ‘social
dilemma’ zone, defection is the Nash equilibrium solution
even though both subordinates would do better if they
could agree to exercise restraint. The case where z ¼ 1
applies to groups that exhibit a linear hierarchical structure,
such that each individual monitors and targets its immediate
subordinate for punishment (labelled ‘chain of command’ in
the ﬁgure). In this case, restraint is stable if the cost of being
evicted outweighs the beneﬁts of claiming additional repro-
duction (i.e. C/B . 1) (see appendix for details of the
model).
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SUBORDINATES
We assume that the dominant evicts a single subordinate
if the total share of reproduction claimed by the two sub-
ordinates exceeds some threshold pmax. Subordinates
make a simultaneous decision to adopt one of two strat-
egies: restraint R, which entails the subordinate claiming
a share equal to exactly pmax/2; or defection D, which
entails the subordinate claiming a share greater than
pmax/2. Defection is assumed to bring a constant ﬁtness
beneﬁt B, provided the defector can avoid being evicted.
If a subordinate is evicted, we assume that it suffers a
cost C. The extent to which dominants target transgres-
sors varies from z ¼ 0 (implying that the dominant
evicts at random with respect to subordinate behaviour)
to z ¼ 1 (implying that eviction is perfectly targeted,
such that subordinates who exercise restraint are never
evicted). If both subordinates defect, we assume that
the dominant evicts one of them at random. Pay-offs
Wi,j of strategy i against j are as follows: WR,R ¼ 0,
WR,D ¼ 2C(1 2 F), WD,R ¼ 2CF þ B(1 2 F), WD,D ¼
(B/2) 2 (C/2), where F(¼(1 þ z)/2) is the probability
that a subordinate who plays D is evicted when
paired with an R-strategist. Setting B equal to 1 and
solving for the critical value of C for which restraint or
defection are dominant strategies yields, respectively, the
following equations CR ¼ 1/z; CD ¼ (1 2 z)/(1 þ z).
These equations deﬁne the upper and lower curves,
respectively, in ﬁgure 3.
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